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Abstract: The aim of this study is to analyse the management of rural estates during the 
19th century and the first half of the 20th century using basically the expenditure 
registered in bookkeeping records. The information collected proceeds from eight 
private archives, and from them we have reconstructed a total of ten series of 
bookkeeping records which describe a group of farms spread throughout the main 
agricultural zones of Catalonia (Spain). The changes in the quantities provided by the 
landowners towards the running costs can help us to understand their role in the 
processes of growth and intensification of agricultural production. We show that, while 
the level of investment they made was modest, the landownwers did not behave like 
absentee landlords or idly live off their rents. The examples analysed give us some 
insight into the rationale behind some of the landowners’ decisions and the diverse 
responses that they adopted according to the circumstances and the prevailing social and 
environmental conditions on their estates. The accounting records have proved to be a 
valuable source in this sense. 
 
Resumen: El objetivo de esta investigación es analizar la gestión de la propiedad 
agraria durante el siglo XIX y la primera mitad del siglo XX, a partir, básicamente, de 
los gastos de explotación registrados en contabilidades agrarias. La información 
recopilada procede de ocho archivos patrimoniales, que han permitido reconstruir un 
total de diez series contables, correspondientes a un conjunto de fincas que cubren las 
principales zonas agrarias de Cataluña. La evolución de las aportaciones de los 
propietarios en los gastos de explotación puede permitirnos conocer su comportamiento 
en los procesos de crecimiento e intensificación de la producción agraria. Demostramos 
que, a pesar que su esfuerzo inversor fuera limitado, el comportamiento de los 
propietarios no se correspondía con formas estrictamente rentistas o absentistas. Los 
ejemplos analizados nos permiten penetrar, hasta cierto punto, en la racionalidad de sus 
decisiones y en la diversidad de respuestas que dieron según las coyunturas y las 
condiciones ambientales y sociales donde se localizaban sus fincas. En este sentido, las 
contabilidades agrarias han constituido una fuente de apreciable utilidad. 
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The management of agricultural estates in Catalonia in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries. An approach through 
bookkeeping1 
Ramón Garrabou (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), Jordi Planas (Universitat de 
Barcelona), Enric Saguer (Universitat de Girona) 
1. Introduction 
European agriculture was affected by important changes during the 19th 
century and the first half of the 20th. The long period of expansion that took 
place in the 19th century ended in a crisis of surplus production which obliged 
the sector to make profound changes in techniques and production methods. 
New forms of specialization were developed, new techniques were devised for 
making agricultural land more productive, and certain labour-saving tools were 
introduced. These factors came together to effect a widespread 
transformation of the agricultural sector in the first half of the 20th century.  
The statistical information available to us gives us a broad idea of the extent of 
this transformation, but does not allow us to reconstruct how these changes 
took place or to identify the social groups that took part in them or how they 
did so.2 The answers to these questions must be sought in sources that are often 
highly idiosyncratic and difficult to extrapolate other settings. Clearly, this raises 
the question of how representative they are.  
The bookkeeping records of agricultural holdings are a notable example of 
such sources. Documents of this kind provide invaluable information on the 
different forms of administration, the details of the forms of tenancy, the 
techniques employed, the changes in production, the level of wages and the 
different ways in which people were employed, how closely the holdings 
followed market trends, and the degree to which the landowner shared in the 
expenses and investments, and so on.  
Obviously, the vision the bookkeeping records offer is based on individual 
cases, and we cannot treat the particular characteristics of one landholding as 
if they were representative of general practices. It must also be borne in mind 
that the keeping of account books was never widespread, and the existence 
of these documents may produce a distorted view of the society as a whole 
because they were kept only by a certain type of landowner or farmer. Even 
so, with these provisos in mind, it is reasonable to assume that the accumulation 
of cases and the repetition of patterns and developments in the analysis of 
these documents can allow us to make general conclusions on certain 
questions.3 
                                                 
1 This paper is part of the research projects HAR2009-13748-C03-01/HIST and HAR2008-02960/HIST, 
financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation 
2 On the possibilities and use of Spanish statistical sources relating to the agrarian sector, see 
Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural (1991). 
3 Many historians have made use of Catalan bookkeeping records in recent years. Among them 
Pascual’s study (2000) of the Torelló family and Pujol’s study (1999) of the Cordoniu landholding 
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Among the many types of document that could be included under 
“agricultural bookkeeping records”, we shall only be concerned with the ones 
that provide information on major landowners. Our intention is to analyse the 
management of rural estates during the 19th century and the first half of the 
20th century using basically the expenditure registered in this type of 
documentation. Our analysis focuses on Catalonia, a Mediterranean region in 
the north-east of the Iberian Peninsula which underwent significant industrial 
development and profound changes in its agricultural sector in the period 
under examination.  
The information collected proceeds from eight private archives (corresponding 
to the Sentmenat, Coll, Nuix, Bru, Negre, Maspons, Riba and Güell families)4, 
and from them we have reconstructed a total of ten series of bookkeeping 
records, most of which cover more than sixty years, and which describe a 
group of farms spread throughout the main agricultural zones of the region.5 
Overlapping these series we have data covering the period from 1821 to 1945. 
As a result, in our opinion, our sample is large enough, and diverse enough, for 
a study of this kind. 
2. The failure of “agricultural capitalism” 
The organization of agricultural work has been considered one of the basic 
issues in the development of the sector. Adam Smith and many economists of 
the 19th century held that the different forms of tenancy were crucial in 
boosting capital investments and in the incorporation of more productive 
technical innovations. In accordance with these principles, it was believed that 
a large estate which was administered directly by the landowners or 
leaseholders using salaried labour was the best way to stimulate agricultural 
growth. Sharecropping, in contrast, was regarded as a less efficient contractual 
arrangement and its continued existence was considered an obstacle to the 
development of the rural economy, given that the peasants lacked the capital 
and the knowledge required to introduce innovation.6  
Literature and the press in Catalonia did much to spread these ideas 
throughout the country. However, no major modifications in the forms of 
tenancy used on large rural estates have been detected, and while direct 
farming of the estate was never entirely absent, sharecropping and other 
indirect forms of exploitation were invariably predominant throughout the 19th 
                                                                                                                                               
are particularly interesting. In Spain, the contributions of Pérez Picazo (1991) and Carmona (1995; 
2001) should be mentioned along with the studies included in the two collected volumes 
published by Casado & Robledo (2002) and Robledo & López (2007), respectively. 
4 These consist of a number of properties covering different types of major landowners. They 
include estates that had their origins in feudal nobility, such as that of the Marquis of Sentmenat, 
estates belonging to the lesser nobility of the region (Nuix, the barony of Perpignan), properties 
acquired by public officials (Coll) or families of peasants which emerged as a dominant group in 
many areas during the 18th century (known as hisendats). 
5 Previous studies have made use of these accounting records, namely: Garrabou, Saguer and 
Sala (1993); Garrabou, Planas and Saguer (2001a and 2001b); Planas (1994 and 1996); Saguer 
(2007) 
6 See Koning (1994). 
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century. None of the landowners studied moved decidedly towards direct 
farming of their estates with salaried farm workers, and the overwhelming 
majority of their estates were leased in the traditional manner to tenant farmers 
(masovers) and sharecroppers, sometimes beneath the strict control of an 
administrator.  
Although sharecropping had a long history in Catalonia, it was used not simply 
due to the weight of tradition, but because it also offered advantages. The Coll 
estates are a good example of this. Tomàs Coll was a customs official in 
Barcelona who bought a number of farms after the ecclesiastical confiscations 
(disentailment) of the first half of the 19th century. He was, therefore, a new 
landowner for whom tradition counted little; as such he was in a position to 
choose the form of land tenancy that would provide him with the greatest 
return on his investment. For this reason, he initially considered the option of 
direct farming of the estates with salaried labourers, only to decide, after 
examining the alternatives, that “the desire and necessity of increasing 
income” obliged him to maintain the sharecropping system.  
Attempts to apply direct farming to an estate, or even part of it, inevitably 
produced poor results. Convinced that close attention would yield better results 
than the sharecropping system, the Marquis of Sentmenat tried to introduce 
direct farming on his estates in Urgell. But the experience did not bear out his 
expectations and the outcome of the seven-year experiment (1873 – 1879) was 
a loss of 12,000 pesetas. As a result, he returned to the ancient system of land 
use. The Maspons family’s experiment with direct farming also ended in 
disappointment. In 1912 the landowner planted fruit trees (especially almonds 
and hazelnuts) in the expectation of high profits, and employed salaried farm 
workers in some of their plots. The poor results were undeniable. The landowner 
himself, after analysing his accounts, noted that his profits would have been 
greater had he leased out the land, and decided that the cause of his failure 
had been the cost of the wages.7  
Experiences like these help to explain why sharecropping and other forms of 
indirect exploitation not only persisted after the crisis at the end of the century 
but actually strengthened their position as basic systems for managing large 
estates.8 This situation is confirmed in several reports commissioned by the 
authorities and in an abundance of literature from the mid-19th century 
onwards discussing the best system of tenancy for large estates.  
In our opinion, the fundamental reason for this decision was technological. 
Landowners farming directly were unable to provide their workers with 
significant better equipment than that available to tenants or sharecroppers. 
And in the absence of higher technology, the theoretical advantages of direct 
farming could be outweighed by problems in the control and organization of 
labour. Efficient management of the estates could be hampered by distance 
or by ignorance of the social conditions and techniques used in exploiting the 
                                                 
7 Pascual (2000) describes a similar experience. 
8  An exception that can be attributed to the integration of a farm in an agro industrial business in 
Pujol (1999).  
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land, and in some cases proved impossible.9 Even in those cases where the 
landowner was technically proficient and aware of the social situation of the 
workers, or delegated the running of the estate to an able, honest 
administrator, the expense of maintaining permanent and temporary labourers 
placed such a burden on the current accounts that  direct farming was not a 
viable option. 
The use of masovers or sharecroppers provided the landowner with sufficient 
manpower while reducing the cost of administration and without sacrificing his 
capacity to dictate the farming practices. These forms of contractual farming 
entailed a certain degree of external control, for while the greater part of the 
day-to-day decisions were taken by the farmer, they also provided many 
opportunities for intervention: the landowner could decide on the use of the 
land, the technical means available for carrying out the tasks, whether to 
maintain or increase the productive capacity of the estate, and so on. 
The practice of purely monetary leases on estates was practically non-existent 
in Catalonia. Such income registered in the account books under this concept 
is due to the lease of small plots, the rent paid by the sharecropper for his home 
and other activities not related to agriculture such as grazing land and quarries. 
Sharecropping continued to form the backbone of the management of large 
land holdings. The figure of the masover was essential, not only because of the 
produce of his labour, but because he was also responsible for collecting the 
rent from small plots, keeping watch over the woodlands and exerting a 
degree of control over the poorer farmers who worked smaller plots. 
3. The management of large agricultural estates through the 
analysis of their running costs 
The estates analysed are all different in many ways – in their size, the number of 
farms and the use of the land, and so on– but we are particularly interested in 
contrasting data from a wide range of sources in order to find common 
features. We start by distinguishing between (a) the estates located in the 
humid areas of Catalonia (Gironès, Vic, Vallès Oriental, Valles Occidental, Baix 
Llobregat), where the typical form of rural settlement was the isolated 
farmhouse (mas) and the most common type of contracts were those of 
masoveria – a form of sharecropping that included housing for the tenant – in 
which the landowner received one third of the harvest and played little part in 
the cost of running the farm, and (b) the estates in the dry areas (Urgell, 
Segarra, Anoia) where the conditions were more arid and the form of 
settlement was more concentrated in villages. The form of sharecropping 
practised here was called mitgeria, in reference to the fact that the landowner 
received half of the harvest. In this case, because of the lower productive 
capacity of the land, the landowner had a greater participation in the running 
costs in order to achieve an acceptable return. 
 
                                                 
9 On the importance of efficiency in control and organization of labour for economic growth, see 
Toharia, 1984. 
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Map 1. Location of the estates analysed 
 
 
In any case, the sharecropping contracts, masoveria included, were a central 
element of all these estates, and the account books register only the parts of 
the running costs that the landowner paid a share of. They omit the most 
important production costs, especially those related to labour and basic inputs 
such as seeds and fertilizers, which were usually provided from the reuse of farm 
produce. Even so, the landowners made regular financial contributions, 
although the quantities involved were usually small. One part of these 
payments went towards what we could call the current expenditure , while the 
other part, which we call extraordinary expenses (the maintenance and 
investment expenditure), was spent on the upkeep and expansion of the 
productive capacity of the farms. The remainder consisted of tax payments, 
land charges and loans to sharecroppers, which we will disregard for now. 
The changes in the quantities provided by the landowners towards the running 
costs can help us to understand their role in the processes of growth and 
intensification of agricultural production. The evolution of the running costs is 
shown in figure 1, and reveals a number of common features despite the 
diversity of conditions and characteristics of each estate. There is a clear 
correspondence between the series during the 19th century, with a sequence of 
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peaks and troughs that reflect the expansion and contraction of agricultural 
production in Catalonia.  
Figure 1. Evolution of total running costs  
(five-year moving averages in 1913 pesetas) 
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We can identify the following phases: 1 an early period that stretched as far as 
the middle of the 19th century, when the crisis affecting the old social order was 
most severe and the new liberal institutions were established; with the exception 
of the Urgell estate, there is a tendency of landowners to reduce costs by 
sustaining or reducing their contributions; 2 a period of higher expenditures, with 
an important increase in the 1870s coincident with a great expansion of vineyards 
in Catalonia; 3 a new cycle of depression that lasted until the beginning of the 
20th century, reflecting the crisis in Catalan agriculture from the end of the 1880s, 
during which landowners once more reduced their expenditure in line with their 
falling income; 4 a period of moderate recovery in terms of expenditure during 
the first third of the century, although with interruptions, and without reaching the 
level of the pre-crisis years.  
We can safely assume that the periods of expansion led to a greater degree of 
liquidity due to the increase in gross income, which disposed the landowner to 
take on a greater share of the costs, but that this expenditure would shrink as 
income fell in periods of contraction. We see a spectacular increase in the 
running costs on the estate of the Marquis of Sentmenat in Urgell during the 1870s, 
when viticulture was in expansion, because at the time the landowner 
experimented with the use of salaried labour. However, with the crisis of the end 
of the century, the expenditure on the estate fell sharply and remained low until 
the early years of the following century. The estates of the Güell family also 
registered a decline in expenditure in the 1920s that can be interpreted as a 
strategy to sustain income in a period of falling agricultural prices (especially 
severe in the case of wine) when there was little margin for raising the land 
revenue. In some cases, the landowner withdrew gradually from direct 
involvement in the management of his estates, limiting his activity to collecting 
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rents and maintaining the value of the land. In other cases, such as the Bru family, 
the landowner had to increase expenditure to counter the effects of the crisis.10 
A second observation can be made with regard to the scale of the financial 
resources that landowners provided. While these might increase substantially in 
periods of expansion, occasionally doubling or tripling the amounts from previous 
periods, they continued to be relatively modest. There is nothing from the records 
of this period to suggest any spectacular shift that might have led to radical 
change in the tenancy regime. The annual expenditure of most of the estates 
analysed varied between 1,000 and 2,000 pesetas (at 1913 value), and only rose 
as high as 3,000 or 4,000 pesetas in exceptional circumstances. These figures 
represent a relatively small outlay when compared with the gross income (25 to 
30% in the humid areas and around 40% in the arid areas).11  This would seem to 
confirm that the landowners’ basic management strategy consisted of avoiding 
most of the running costs. 
Although the criteria underlying our classification might be open to criticism, we 
have spread the total expenditure among different concepts in order to highlight 
the role of the landowner in the organization of the production process. First of all, 
we have grouped the items of current expenditure together, including wages 
and productive inputs for which the farmers were not liable, administration costs 
(administrator’s fees, technical and legal services that were requested etc.) and 
a number of other payments for luxury items, charitable causes, or religious 
concerns, although always involving very small amounts. This expenditure may not 
have any direct relation to production costs, but it reinforced the social standing 
of the landowner and had a bearing on the smooth running of the estate.12 
Although expenditure on maintenance and investment are clearly defined in 
analysis, they are hard to distinguish in the account books, and so we have 
decided to include them together as extraordinary expenses.13 Adding these 
extraordinary expenses to the current expenditure gives us the total running cost 
of the estate.  
As table 1 shows, the most important part of the landowner’s share lies in this 
current expenditure. Throughout the 19th century current expenditure accounted 
for between two-thirds and three-quarters of the total costs, gradually declining in 
the early years of the 20th century. The only estate to maintain a high level of 
current expenditure was the Bru family, due to the owner’s participation in a 
livestock sharecropping tenancy (a relatively rare initiative among the large 
Catalan landholdings). If we consider that the total expenditure did not increase 
in the first third of the 20th century, this sharp decline in current expenditure might 
                                                 
10  The estate of the Torelló family also registered a substantial increase in landowner’s expenditure in 
the 1920s due to the rising cost of salaries and the increased use of chemical fertilizers (Pascual, 
2000). 
11 The expenditure of the Torelló family varied between 20 and 30% of gross income, although the 
estates were located in the arid part of Catalonia (Pascual, 2000 : II, 214). 
12 This group includes payments that formed part of the paternalist role that many great 
landowners adopted (donations, charity, sustaining religious celebrations, local festivals, etc.) 
With a few exceptions, the quantities involved were insignificant, except from a sociological 
perspective. 
13 It was common for these two concepts to be combined in private accounts and in official 
documents (Perren, 1970) as well as in the reconstructions carried out by historians (Pascual, 
2000). 
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be an indication of the withdrawal of rural landowners which we mentioned 
above and which was noted by contemporary observers.14 The reduction in 
expenditure should be seen as a response to the conditions of the agricultural 
sector in the aftermath of the crisis of the turn of the century, with overproduction 
and a tendency for prices of agricultural produce to remain stable or fall. 
Table 1. Current Expenditure  
as a percentage of total running costs 
 Marquis of Sentmenat Coll i 
Vehí 
Nuix Bru Maspons I. Güell López 
 
Sentmenat Plegamans Vic Urgell Guissona Ivorra Gironès Vallès 
Oriental 
Cervelló Corbera 
1821-30 87.9 89.3  69.4       
1831-40 60.5 83.1  88.4  82.6     
1841-50 80.2 59.3  86.4 54.4 85.9     
1851-60 69.6 51.2  79.6 35.1 44.9     
1861-70 69.8 61.9  79.4 55.5 50.9     
1871-80 59.5 60.0 50.1 65.3       
1881-90 60.9 68.0 73.0 72.4   85.7    
1891-00 81.4 67.6 75.0 71.8   67.8    
1901-10 9.9   62.7   79.9  64.8 55.2 
1911-20 51.8       43.5 50.6 50.7 
1921-30       89.2 46.1  66.7 
1931-36       75.7 58.1   
1941-45        27.7   
 
a/ Wage costs 
Although wage costs amounted to a significant part of the current account 
expenditure on some estates, they were always small in absolute terms. The 
fundamental premise underlying the dominant form of tenancy was that it 
avoided the problems of hiring and supervising the workforce, although this 
premise was applied in many different ways. The landowners who possessed 
properties in the areas where mitgeria was predominant had to assume a greater 
burden of wage costs. These areas were less productive, and the landowners had 
to take a more active role in the running of these properties in order to achieve 
an acceptable return. The sharecropping contracts in these areas systematically 
included clauses which established that the landowner would contribute to the 
payment of labour costs during the harvest and sowing seasons. The wages for 
sowing, threshing and decanting made up the largest portion of the wage costs 
that the landowner had to provide.  
In the areas where masoveria was predominant, cost of farm labour was 
practically non-existent for the landowners and the overall expenditure on wages 
was vastly reduced. Most of the salary costs were associated with attempts to 
                                                 
14 About this question, see Lana, 2010. 
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apply direct farming to some plots, or the management of non-agricultural 
resources such as woodlands, which, on the Maspons estate, for example, 
amounted to 46% of the running costs. 
Table 2. Wage costs  
as a percentage of current expenditure 
 Marquis of Sentmenat Coll i 
Vehí 
Nuix Bru Maspons I. Güell López 
 
Sentmenat Plegamans Vic Urgell Guissona Ivorra Gironès Vallès 
Oriental 
Cervelló Corbera 
1821-30 52.2 37.4  48.2       
1831-40 52.5 34.1  37.2  93.6     
1841-50 43.9 37.8  45.0 33.0 32.1     
1851-60 27.3 26.6  42.6 21.8 19.0     
1861-70 26.7 34.9  47.5 21.5 36.6     
1871-80 36.4 13.5 9.5 65.4       
1881-90 47.8 11.9 6.1 46.8   36.9    
1891-00 17.6 1.8 6.2 48.4   35.7    
1901-10 0.0   42.2   23.3  80.3 35.0 
1911-20 1.8       61.6 62.0 77.6 
1921-30       15.1 54.6  54.5 
1931-36       24.4 33.9   
1941-45        9.9   
 
In some estates (Sentmenat, Urgell) there was a steady rise in wage costs in 
absolute terms from the middle of the 19th century until the 1870s and 1880s, but 
this increase does not indicate significant changes in the share of these wages 
that the landowners paid. In general, this increase was related to attempts to 
expand and intensify the specialization in wine growing. Instead, there was a 
tendency for landowners to contain and reduce these expenses in the aftermath 
of the crisis. If we take into account the inflation and spectacular increase in 
salaries after World War I, on the one hand, and the need to intensify production 
on the other, we conclude that the landowners passed the burden of these 
increased production costs on to the farmers.15 Thanks to these indirect forms of 
land tenancy the landowners could let the producers take the strain of adjusting 
to these new market conditions in which wages rose sharply, but were not 
balanced by a corresponding increase in prices for agricultural produce.  
b/ Expenditure on material inputs 
As table 3 shows, the volume of this share is far lower than the previous one. 
Although these expenditures grew in periods of expansion and shrank in 
recessions, in both absolute and relative terms, they were of little significance. 
The holdings in the arid area of Catalonia likewise showed a higher level of 
                                                 
15 On the changes in agricultural wages during the 19th century and the first third of the 20th, see 
Garrabou, Pujol, Colomé (1991); Garrabou, Tello (1995); Garrabou, Tello, Roca (1999). 
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expenditure than the area of masoveria, with the exception of the Bru family 
estate, where there was a sharecropping contract for livestock that entailed 
successive purchases of cattle for breeding or fattening.  
Table 3. Material inputs costs  
as a percentage of current expenditure 
 Marquis of Sentmenat Coll i 
Vehí 
Nuix Bru Maspons I. Güell López 
 
Sentmenat Plegamans Vic Urgell Guissona Ivorra Gironès Vallès 
Oriental 
Cervelló Corbera 
1821-30 3.2 16.2  11.4       
1831-40 0.0 0.8  28.6  2.7     
1841-50 9.8 0.0  19.9 67.0 17.5     
1851-60 1.6 1.1  16.1 41.3 22.9     
1861-70 3.5 5.4  6.8 20.2 15.8     
1871-80 10.7 11.6 3.1 14.1       
1881-90 12.0 14.0 5.3 23.6   50.3    
1891-00 12.7 7.3 15.8 7.7   52.3    
1901-10 0.0   13.4   61.2  15.1 15.0 
1911-20 0.0       9.3 31.7 17.9 
1921-30       75.0 5.4  43.8 
1931-36       75.2 1.5   
1941-45        0.0   
 
In these areas, where the productive capacity was lower, the landowners 
tended to play a more active role. The mitgeria contracts established that the 
landowner would provide a part or, in some cases, all of the seeds. While the 
usual practice was to use cereals from the previous year’s harvest, occasional 
poor harvests, poor quality seeds or the advisability of renewing the seed stock 
made it necessary to acquire seed in the market. These purchases could 
represent a significant outlay, as occurred on the estates that the Marquis of 
Sentmenat possessed in Urgell in 1840, 1849, 1855 and 1882, when the cost of 
seeds made up more than 90% of the cost of inputs. The purchase of seeds is 
also noticeable in the series of accounts of the Guissona and Ivorra estates. 
These purchases could be interpreted as an expression of the owner’s interest in 
improving productivity by following the recommendations of 19th century 
agronomists to renew the seed stock on a regular basis. At the beginning of the 
20th century these purchases of seeds diminished in importance in comparison 
to the cost of mineral fertilizers, which became more widespread. The system of 
contracts used in the arid areas of Catalonia did not prevent the introduction 
of this decisive technological innovation.16 
In the areas of masoveria, this part of the expenditure was far lower and was 
almost entirely related to wine growing and the expansion of viticulture. In 
contrast, the landowner took hardly any responsibility for the costs of cereal 
production, just as we have seen in the case of wage costs. On the Marquis of 
                                                 
16 Pujol (1998a and 1998b). 
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Sentmenat’s estates in Vic, environmental conditions limited the spread of wine 
growing, and the amount of the landowner’s inputs expenditure was 
insignificant. The only notable exception was an initial trial in the application of 
guano in 1880 and the regular purchases of significant amounts of this fertilizer 
from 1889 onwards.  
 
c/ Administration costs 
Although all forms of tenancy shared the common purpose of transferring the 
cost and control of the workforce onto the farmers themselves, the landowners 
had to establish mechanisms of supervision over which they could exert little 
personal control; on the whole, they were obliged to rely on their stewards.17 It 
was often the steward’s job to ensure that the work of the tenant farmers and 
sharecroppers was satisfactory, to choose trustworthy men to watch over the 
harvest, to collect emphyteutical rents and other rents and to create a close 
relationship with the local community in order to prevent conflicts. The 
documents confirm the presence of this landowners' agent on many of the 
estates studied. 
Table 4. Administration costs  
as a percentage of current expenditure 
 Marquis of Sentmenat Coll i 
Vehí 
Nuix Bru Maspons I. Güell López 
 
Sentmenat Plegamans Vic Urgell Guissona Ivorra Gironès Vallès 
Oriental 
Cervelló Corbera 
1821-30 38.2 46.4  36.5       
1831-40 21.2 61.5  29.3  0.0     
1841-50 40.3 61.2  32.5 0.0 43.6     
1851-60 58.9 67.1  40.5 32.8 39.2     
1861-70 31.3 53.2  44.9 58.3 35.3     
1871-80 48.6 60.3 80.0 18.3       
1881-90 37.3 57.3 84.0 27.1   12.8    
1891-00 66.8 62.1 62.0 39.5   12.0    
1901-10 64.1   35.0   15.5  1.7 46.7 
1911-20 6.3       27.6 1.5 1.5 
1921-30       9.9 36.9  0.0 
1931-36       0.5 56.6   
1941-45        71.2   
 
The presence of a steward was relatively costly, as he would generally receive 
10% of the ordinary gross income. In certain cases, he would receive a lower 
fee – for example, for the sale of timber or in the collection of laudemium or 
unpaid rents. The remainder of these costs comprise payments for legal services 
or an occasional technical report, insurance policies or small expenses such as 
                                                 
17 On the activities of the administrators, see Carmona (1995 and 2001); Garrabou, Planas, Saguer 
(2002); Carmona and Simpson (2003: 191-202). 
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visits to the estates by the steward or the landowner, or the building and 
conservation of boundaries to define the limits of the property.  
Administration costs were among the most important expenditures on many of 
the estates analysed, in some cases amounting to over 50% of the total running 
costs. Although the percentage was lower in the area of mitgeria due to the 
greater importance of wage costs, the amounts paid under this concept were 
still relatively large, which confirms the importance that the landowners 
assigned to it.18  
Unlike the restrictions that were applied in years of recession, administration 
costs remained relatively constant until the 20th century. Then they began to 
decline or even practically disappear, especially in moderately sized estates 
where the landowner could assume the task of overseeing, as the Bru family did 
from the 1880s onwards. In this case, as on the Maspons estate, this shift in 
behaviour coincided with a tendency to convert the masoveria into a  
leasehold arrangement, so that the landowner could reduce his role in 
managing the farm. 
d/ Expenditure on maintenance and investment  
Channelling the flow of economic resources into the improvement of the 
productive capacity, increasing the fixed capital, and introducing new crops and 
new technologies have been some of the ways in which contemporary 
agriculture has grown. One way of measuring the efficiency of a tenancy regime 
is to gauge the incentives or discouragement that exist for investments in 
productivity. It has been said that sharecropping and other types of short-term 
leases did not encourage the farmers themselves to invest, as the results would 
not be felt in the short term; the length of their contracts was uncertain, the 
sharecroppers capture only a part of the marginal increase in productivity and 
there was no legislation to ensure compensation for any improvements that they 
undertook themselves. The logic of the system, at least from this point of view, 
meant that the responsibility for investments fell squarely on the landowners. What 
can the bookkeeping records we have studied tell us about the behaviour of the 
landowners with regard to this vital aspect of the management of agricultural 
estates? 
In most of the estates analysed there is a clear tendency for these investments 
to increase from the middle of the 19th century onwards. In some cases, the 
amounts doubled or tripled compared with the beginning of the century, but in 
the last decade they suffered a sharp decrease. Even so, in absolute terms the 
amounts were always modest, and there was no significant variation in the 
relative size of this expense in overall running costs. In comparison with the total 
of gross income, these expenditures barely reached 15%-20%, and only in very 
few cases reached 30%. They fell sharply after the late 19th century depression.19 
The overall tendency and fluctuations of this expense closely mirror the situation 
for wine growing. The expansion in the early phases recorded in Sentmenat, 
                                                 
18 Pascual (2000: II, 178-179) came to the same conclusion in the analysis of the Torelló family 
estates. 
19 Some studies of Victorian England indicate that this behaviour on the part of the investor was 
not an isolated historical quirk: Becket (1986), Holderness (1972), O’Grada (1975). 
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Plegamans, Guissona, Ivorra and, to a lesser extent, in Urgell, was closely 
related to the cost of planting vines.20 In Sentmenat, from 1851 to 1860, the cost 
of planting vines represented 80% of all investment and, after a brief period of 
paralysis, rose again to 60% of the total in the years between 1881 and 1890. 
The purchase of barrels, presses and other instruments for the production of 
wine and the construction of cellars also formed a significant part of the 
investments of estates that specialized in wine production. The prospects of the 
wine market generated huge expectations and the expansion of wine 
production continued to absorb a large part of the investments made until the 
1880s. 
 
Table 5. Maintenance and investment costs  
as a percentage of gross income 
 
 Marquis of Sentmenat Coll i 
Vehí 
Nuix Bru Maspons I. Güell López 
 
Sentmenat Plegamans Vic Urgell Guissona Ivorra Gironès Vallès 
Oriental 
Cervelló Corbera 
1821-30 5 3  10       
1831-40 2 3  6  5     
1841-50 7 10  4 12 3     
1851-60 10 14  7 31 31     
1861-70 17 13  8 12 50     
1871-80 15 12 17 30       
1881-90 23 9 6 18   2    
1891-00 4 8 5 11   6    
1901-10 18   14   5  15 26 
1911-20 2       7 8 8 
1921-30       4 33 3 8 
1931-36       6 11   
1941-45        26   
 
After the late 19th century depression, the amounts invested were smaller. In 
those places where investment continued to be significant, the money was 
used principally in improving housing conditions and had little effect on 
production. On the Maspons estate, for example, improving living conditions 
accounted for over half of the total running costs, but the greater part of this 
(53%) went on renovating the landowner’s farm-house. While the value of the 
property increased, it had only a slight effect on the productive capacity of the 
estate, underlining its function as a reservoir of value. The owner of the Goy 
family estate spent a large part of the total income (about 35% of the gross 
income) on maintenance and investment at the end of the 1920s and at the 
start of the turbulent 1930s. This amount was mostly spent on improving the 
housing conditions of the masovers and on building stables for livestock, from 
                                                 
20 This conclusion is confirmed in the Torelló family estate (Pascual, 2000: II, 196). 
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which the estate received no income.21 In this case, the social and political 
context was probably a major influence, as was the ideology of the landowner, 
who had links with the currents of social Catholicism.  
In the estates analysed there was hardly any investment in agricultural 
machinery except for the occasional purchase of a  grapes press or of  tools for 
the mill. During the 19th century there was no guarantee that machinery would 
offer any great return, and in any case the continuation of sharecropping 
meant that the demand for machinery to replace manual labour was low. As 
long as the farmers were in charge of nearly all the labour costs, the 
landowners were understandably reluctant to pay for machinery which would 
provide little in the way of profits.  
One final observation: a high percentage of the expenditure on investment 
and maintenance consisted of wages paid to farm labourers, builders, 
workmen and carpenters, and only a small proportion was actually spent on 
materials and tools. Along with the increase in wages from 1914 onwards, this 
helps to explain why investment was so constrained during the first third of the 
20th century. The fact that most of the spending on investment was on labour 
costs meant that there was actually a greater potential margin of action on 
peasant holdings, where this resource was relatively abundant and, to a certain 
extent, the conditions were favourable for improvements based on the use of 
the workforce.  
4. Discussion and conclusions  
It would be interesting at this point to evaluate how useful these bookkeeping 
records are in analysing the different forms of management of large rural 
estates in Catalonia, and to ask ourselves if they allow us to establish whether 
these practices were appropriate for furthering agricultural development, or 
efficient in making profits. We have seen that Catalan landowners 
systematically preferred sharecropping and other forms of indirect 
management. Does this indicate that they were content simply to collect their 
rents, that they lacked entrepreneurial spirit, or that their economic behaviour 
was irrational?  
Between the years of 1820 and 1940, agriculture in Catalonia developed in an 
environment of relatively inflexible credit and labour markets, in which the 
results of the harvest were highly unpredictable, especially in the arid regions. In 
these conditions, the use of hired labour or the lease of large estates to one 
farmer created formidable difficulties. On the one hand, few leaseholders 
possessed sufficient resources to run a large estate, and on the other, labour 
became more expensive and any improvement in productivity gained through 
direct farming by the landowner was outweighed by the costs of labour and 
problems of supervision.  
The introduction of machinery to reduce labour costs also came up against 
technical and financial problems. On the technical side, the introduction of  
                                                 
21 The Torelló family estates provide another example: the expenditure on maintenance and 
investment shrank considerably in the beginning of the 20th century, and was more concentrated 
on improvements in the housing conditions of the sharecroppers (Pascual 2000: II, 196). 
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large-scale mechanization onto the farms was not really viable until the 20th 
century was well under way.22 On the financial side, the low income from 
agriculture meant that the return on capital invested in machinery might be 
lower than that obtained in other sectors. So, in order to obtain the best return 
on capital, investors would naturally direct their funds to sectors that offered 
higher returns than agriculture. Sharecropping and other indirect forms of land  
tenancy required minimal capital outlay from landowners and represented an 
efficient way of employing labour with low supervision costs. 
The evolution of expenditure made by the landowners shows that they were 
reluctant to spend anything more than modest amounts. This behaviour could 
lead to a situation where the resources made available for farming were 
inadequate and less efficient than they might have been with other 
technologies that were available at the time. All this might lead us to conclude 
that the landowners had little entrepreneurial spirit and to associate 
sharecropping with outdated systems in which the lack of capital investment 
led inevitably to stagnation.  
But if this had been the case, we would find a dual structure during this period, 
with the presence of dynamic owner-run estates on one hand and backward 
estates leased to sharecroppers on the other. The data from the account books 
does not support this thesis. On the contrary, no significant differences have 
been detected either in the technologies used or in the levels of productivity 
between sharecropper-run estates and those farmed directly by the landowner 
using family members or hired labourers. This suggests that the level of capital 
available was sufficient to implement agricultural practices which were at least 
on a par with those in common use and which were considered most 
appropriate for each area.  
Although these forms of tenancy placed the burden of paying most of the 
running costs on the shoulders of the farmers, landowners were willing to 
increase their share of the expenditure when the occasion demanded it, as 
happened on the Marquis of Sentmenat’s estates in Urgell. This landowner not 
only provided the money for the seeds and a part of the labour costs, but often 
gave loans to his sharecroppers for the purchase of work animals or to pay 
harvesters.  
If we want to examine whether these tenancy forms boosted the introduction 
of innovative practices to improve productivity, the evidence is less clear. We 
have already seen how modest the scale of investment was throughout the 
period; although there was a slight increase in the second half of the 19th 
century, it declined in general in the first third of the 20th. This points to an 
ambiguous attitude on the part of the landowners. They were aware of the 
need to inject resources in order to bring about improvements, but the large 
sums involved made them apprehensive, and this attitude seemed to become 
more pronounced in the first decades of the 20th century.  
The introduction of new forms of crop rotation, one of the most basic 
technological changes to be applied in advanced agricultural systems, is 
barely recorded in Catalonia. As some agronomists had warned at the end of 
the 19th century, the environment, and in particular the pronounced aridity, 
                                                 
22 Gallego (1986); Garrabou (1990); Martínez Ruiz (1995 and 2000); Simpson (1997: 204-236). 
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made it impossible to employ more intensive forms of rotation on a large part of 
the cultivated land in Catalonia. The few attempts made ended in failure and 
the idea was abandoned. In the more humid areas, however, the conditions 
were more favourable and it became possible to reduce the fallow period and 
introduce new rotations. Even so, the introduction of leguminous forage crops 
such as alfalfa or sainfoin ran into difficulties derived from the prevailing type of 
contracts used. It has been suggested that the clauses in the contracts 
between landowner and tenant farmers which insisted on the cultivation of 
cereals and the maintenance of fallow periods impeded changes in the 
rotation of crops and prevented the expansion of crops for cattle fodder, 
without which intensive livestock farming was impossible. The masoveria 
contracts in the humid areas of Catalonia did not encourage the adoption of 
these innovations, and it could be argued that they were an obstacle.  
Livestock farming emerged as the most profitable branch of agriculture at the 
end of the 19th century, but its slow expansion was probably due to the 
persistence of the contracts mentioned above. Landowners rarely chose to 
participate actively in this form of production, preferring instead to leave it in 
the hands of their sharecroppers. This may also explain why the expansion of 
this form of agriculture was so limited throughout the period. We may wonder 
whether this scant interest in the livestock sector on the part of the landowners 
was due to their unwillingness to invest what they saw as excessive amounts of 
capital, or whether other factors played a part, such as the problems of 
supervision. The reasons for their attitude are still unclear, and the only 
information our documents can give us is that the landowners gradually lost 
interest in this type of farming, which ended up almost entirely in the hands of 
the sharecroppers. 
As regards industrial fertilizers, the system of contracts did not impede their use 
or their expansion, and in many cases it was the landowner or administrator 
who suggested that they be introduced. This is particularly true of the arid 
regions, where the lack of fertilizers was one of the factors that prevented 
increased yield from the crops grown. The account books begin to register this 
type of expenditure at the end of the 19th century, when these fertilizers 
improved in price, quality, and efficiency. The costs were divided between the 
landowner and the sharecropper in the same proportion as the share of the 
harvests.  
The importance of irrigation for their estates persuaded landowners to finance 
maintenance work and improvements in their reservoirs and irrigation channels 
and to buy pumps and other equipment. The weight of these costs was 
determined to a large extent by the character of each of the estates involved. 
In the case of the Maspons family, for example, the improvement of irrigation 
systems accounted for between 11% and 12% of the total spending on 
maintenance and investment. 
Finally, we should mention the intensification of tree and shrub orchards, which 
proved to be the most efficient way of increasing productivity in large areas of 
Catalonia in the latter half of the 19th century. It was not only the vineyards that 
enjoyed a spectacular expansion, but also the plantations of olives, almonds, 
hazelnuts and carobs. The expansion in this sector called for significant 
investment which sharecroppers and tenant farmers were rarely willing to 
undertake. This attitude is perfectly comprehensible when we take into 
account that their contracts, while always renewable, were usually valid for 
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between one and five years, and offered no guarantee that they could 
redeem the investments they made. In these circumstances, the landowners 
had two possible courses of action. Firstly, they could pay all the costs of 
planting, or secondly, they could use other contracts that passed the costs of 
planting on to the farmers by giving them long-term contracts, which were 
normally over twenty years. We have seen from the account books that a 
significant part of the investments made in estates in wine-growing areas was 
due to the planting of new vines, but most of the landowners preferred to use 
long-term contracts such as the rabassa morta, which terminated either after 
50 years or when two thirds of the original vines had died, when they wanted to 
increase the area dedicated to these crops. We can deduce from this that the 
landowners sidestepped the limitations inherent in different forms of 
sharecropping by taking advantage of other types of contract which were 
already in use in rural Catalonia. 
This would seem to confirm the hypothesis that, while the level of investment 
they made was modest, the landowning families did not behave like absentee 
landlords or idly live off their rents.23 The examples we have analysed have 
given us some insight into the rationale behind some of the landowners’ 
decisions and the diverse responses that they adopted according to the 
circumstances and the prevailing social and environmental conditions on their 
estates. The accounting records have proved a valuable source in this sense, 
although the incomplete and highly local nature of the information they 
contain means that we should beware drawing hasty conclusions. However, 
the bookkeeping can provide a useful complement when aggregating 
evidence for an approximate understanding, especially in the case of 
Catalonia and, by extension, Spain, when we consider the scarcity and 
unreliability of the statistical sources for the agricultural sector. Of course, the 
data from these account books should never be analysed in isolation, without 
reference to either other property documents or the form of land tenancy. As 
we have seen, the predominant form of agricultural contract in any area 
establishes limits on the contents of landowner’s account books. This means 
that the contracts cannot be left aside even when what is being analysed is 
the landowner’s management, or when the account books are consulted to 
provide series of data on the wages, yields and other standard parameters. To 
sum up, the analysis of agrarian bookkeeping is an enormously laborious task, 
but one that can provide us with a clear picture of the rural society of a 
particular period.  
                                                 
23 As a contrast, see Martínez Alier (1968). 
 
19 
References 
Beckett, J. V. (1986): The Aristocracy in England, 1660-1914, Oxford: Blackwell.  
Carmona, Juan (1995): “Las estrategias económicas de la vieja aristocracia española y el 
cambio agrario en el siglo XIX”, Revista de Historia Económica, Año XIII, 1, pp. 63-88. 
Carmona, Juan (2001): La aristocracia terrateniente y el cambio agrario en España en el siglo 
XIX: la casa de Alcañices, 1790-1910, Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León. 
Carmona, Juan; Simpson, James (2003): El laberinto de la agricultura española. Instituciones, 
contratos y organización entre 1850 y 1936, Monografías de Historia Rural, 2, SEHA, Zaragoza: 
Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza. 
Casado, Hilario; Robledo, Ricardo (eds) (2002) Fortuna y negocios: formación y gestión de los 
grandes patrimonios (siglos XVI-XX), Valladolid, Universidad de Valladolid. 
Gallego, Domingo (1986): “Transformaciones técnicas de la agricultura española del primer 
tercio del siglo XX”, in: R. Garrabou; C. Barciela; J. I. Jiménez Blanco (eds.), Historia agraria de la 
España contemporánea, vol. 3: El fin de la agricultura tradicional (1900-1960), Barcelona: Crítica, 
pp. 171-229. 
Garrabou, Ramon (1990): “Sobre el atraso de la mecanización agraria en España, 1850-1933”, 
Agricultura y Sociedad, 57, pp. 41-77. 
Garrabou, Ramon (1994): “Revolución o revoluciones agrarias en el siglo XIX: su difusión en el 
mundo mediterráneo”, in: Agriculturas mediterráneas y mundo campesino, Almería: Instituto de 
Estudios Almerienses, pp. 93-109. 
Garrabou, Ramon; Planas, Jordi; Saguer, Enric (2001a): Un capitalisme imposible? La gestió de la 
gran propietat agrària a la Catalunya contemporània, Vic, Eumo. 
Garrabou, Ramon; Planas, Jordi; Saguer, Enric (2001b): “Sharecropping and the Management of 
Large Rural Estates in Catalonia, 1850-1950”, The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 89-
108. 
Garrabou, Ramon; Planas, Jordi; Saguer, Enric (2002): “Administradores, procuradores y 
apoderados: Una aproximación a las formas de gestión de la gran propiedad agraria en la 
Cataluña contemporánea”, in: H. Casado; R. Robledo (eds.), Fortuna y negocios. Formación y 
gestión de los grandes patrimonios (siglos XVI-XX), Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, pp. 301-
321.  
Garrabou, Ramon; Pujol, Josep; Colomé, Josep (1991): “Salaris, ús i explotació de la força de 
treball agrícola (Catalunya, 1818-1936)”, Recerques, 24, pp. 23-51. 
Garrabou, Ramon; Saguer, Enric; Sala, Pere (1993): “Formas de gestión y evolución de la renta a 
partir del análisis de contabilidades agrarias: los patrimonios del Marqués de Sentmenat en el 
Vallés y Urgell (1820-1917)”, Noticiario de Historia Agraria, 5, pp. 97-125. 
Garrabou, Ramon; Tello, Enric (1995): “Salario come costo, salario come redito: il prezzo delle 
gironate agricole nella Catalogna contemporanea (1727-1930)”, Meridiana, 24, pp. 173-202. 
Garrabou, Ramon; Tello, Enric; Roca, Albert (1999): “Preus del blat i salaris agrícoles a Catalunya 
(1720-1936)”, in: Carreras, Albert et al. (eds.), La industrialització i el desenvolupament econòmic 
d’Espanya, Col·lecció Homenatges, 17: Doctor Jordi Nadal, Barcelona, Publicacions de la 
Universitat de Barcelona, vol. I, pp. 422-460. 
Grupo de Estudios de Historia Rural (1991): Estadísticas históricas de la producción agraria 
española, 1859-1935, Madrid, Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación. 
Holderness, B. A. (1972): “Landlord’s Capital Formation in East Anglia, 1750-1870”, Economic 
History Review, 25, 3, pp. 
Koning, Niek (1994) The Failure of agrarian capitalism : agrarian politics in the UK, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the USA, 1846-1919, London, Routledge 
Lana Berasain, José Miguel (2010): “Was there an “Iberian” pattern of agricultural management? 
Evidence from farm accounts in the Ebro Basin, 1780-1913”, 8th European Social Science History 
Conference, Ghent, 13 April - 16 April 2010 
Martínez Alier, Joan (1968): La estabilidad del latifundio, París: Ruedo Ibérico. 
 
20 
Martínez Ruiz, José Ignacio (1995): “La mecanización de la agricultura española: de la 
dependencia exterior a la producción nacional de maquinaria (1862-1932)”, Revista de Historia 
Industrial, 8, pp.43-63. 
Martínez Ruiz, José Ignacio (2000): Trilladoras y tractores. Energía, tecnología e industria en la 
mecanización de la agricultura española (1862-1967), Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla / Edicions de 
la Universitat de Barcelona. 
O’Grada, Cormac (1975): “The Investment Behaviour of Irish Landlords, 1850-1875: Some 
Preliminary Findings”, Agricultural History Review, 23, II, pp.  
Pascual, Pere (2000): Els Torelló. Una familia igualadina d’advocats i propietaris. Un estudi sobre la 
crisi de l’agricultura tradicional (1841-1930), vol. II, Barcelona, Fundació Vives i Casajuana. 
Pérez Picazo, M. Teresa (1991): “Riqueza territorial y cambio agrícola en la Murcia del siglo XIX. 
Aproximación al studio de una contabilidad privada (1800-1902)”, Agricultura y Sociedad, 61, p. 
39-95 
Perren, Richard (1970): “The Landlord and Agricultural Transformation, 1870-1900”, Agricultural 
History Review, 18, pp. 36-51. 
Planas, Jordi (1994): “Agrarisme i gestió de la propietat al primer terç del segle XX. Un exemple 
significatiu: Jaume Maspons i Camarasa (1872-1934), Estudis d’Història Agrària, 10, pp. 57-83. 
Planas, Jordi (1996): “La contabilidad del patrimonio Maspons (Vallés Oriental, 1913-1945): uso 
del suelo, formas de tenencia y evolución de la renta”, in: Fernández Prieto, Lourenzo; Balboa, 
Xesus (eds.), La sociedad rural en la España contemporánea. Mercado y patrimonio, A Coruña, 
Ediciós do Castro, pp. 183-200. 
Planas, Jordi; Saguer, Enric (2005): “Accounting Records of Large Rural Estates and the Dynamics 
of Agriculture in Catalonia (Spain), 1850-1950”, Accounting Business & Financial History, vol. 15, 
No. 2, pp. 171-185. 
Pujol, Josep (1998a): “La difusión de los abonos minerales y químicos hasta 1936: el caso español 
en el contexto europeo”, Historia Agraria, 15, pp. 143-182. 
Pujol, Josep (1998b): “Los límites ecológicos del crecimiento agrario español entre 1850 y 1935: 
nuevos elementos para el debate”, Revista de Historia Económica, 3, pp 645-675. 
Pujol, Josep (1999): “Trabajo asalariado y actividad agrarian en Can Codorniu: un caso 
excepcional de la explotación del viñedo catalán durante el primer tercio del siglo XX”, in: 
Carreras, Albert et al. (eds.), La industrialització i el desenvolupament econòmic d’Espanya, 
Col·lecció Homenatges, 17: Doctor Jordi Nadal, Barcelona, Publicacions de la Universitat de 
Barcelona, vol. I, pp. 479-506. 
Robledo, Ricardo; López, Santiago (eds) (2007): ¿Interés particular, bienestar público? Grandes 
patrimonios y reformas agrarias, Zaragoza, Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza 
Saguer, Enric (2007): “La Acción Social en casa. Gestión patrimonial de un dirigente sindical 
(Pelayo Negre Pastell, 1924-1936”, en Robledo & López (eds) ¿Interés particular, bienestar 
público? Grandes patrimonios y reformas agrarias, pp. 281-303 
Simpson, James (1997): La agricultura española (1765-1965): la larga siesta, Madrid: Alianza 
Editorial. 
Toharia, Luis (1984): “Extracción de trabajo y cambio técnico: el caso de la fábrica McCormick 
de Chicago, 1880-1900”, Revista de Historia Económica, Año II, 1, pp. 105-126. 
 
